Search for the Unnecessary: Letter to the Editor by Bloomfield, R. E. et al.
Bloomfield, R. E., Courtois, P.-J., Littlewood, B., Strigini, L., Yih, S. & Fan, C.-F. (2002). Search for 
the Unnecessary: Letter to the Editor. Nuclear Engineering International, 47(570), 11 - 11.
City Research Online
Original citation: Bloomfield, R. E., Courtois, P.-J., Littlewood, B., Strigini, L., Yih, S. & Fan, C.-F. 
(2002). Search for the Unnecessary: Letter to the Editor. Nuclear Engineering International, 47(570), 
11 - 11.
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/1599/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 
LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING NEWS 
 
(appeared as Search for the Unnecessary: Letter to the Editor.  In Nuclear Engineering 
International, by P.-J. Courtois, R. Bloomfield, B. Littlewood, L. Strigini January 2002, Vol 47, N° 
570, p. 11) 
 
 
Dear Editor, 
 
We were very concerned to read the recent article “Search for the unnecessary” (NEI issue of 
October 2001, pp.24-26) which appears to suggest that BBNs (Bayesian Belief Nets) are a magic 
wand that can be used to reduce the cost of assessing the safety of software-based systems. The 
authors suggest that the IV&V of Sizewell B and perhaps of other plants was excessively expensive 
because no faults were found. This seems to us a mistaken view of the purpose of IV&V, which is 
mainly to gain justifiable confidence in a system. The fact that no faults were found in this instance 
does not in any way detract from the necessity of the exercise.  
 
Whilst recognising the importance and usefulness of the Bayesian formalism for representing 
uncertainty (indeed, we have ourselves worked extensively in this area for many years), we believe 
BBNs represent just that – a helpful formalism. 
 
The problem of safety assessment, instead, is essentially one of obtaining and marshalling 
appropriate evidence. In the case of software-based systems this poses difficulties that we believe to 
be intrinsic, and thus not open to 'magic bullet' solutions. For example: 
 
• The relationship between the quality of software development processes and the quality of 
the resulting software products - particularly their dependability - is poorly understood; 
 
• The essential discontinuity of software behaviour limits the claims that can be made about 
future behaviour from successful testing, and makes the effect of any changes much less 
predictable; 
 
• Claims for 'complete perfection' are not believable for systems of today's complexity. 
 
The consequence is that safety cases depend to a large extent upon marshalling and vetting highly 
disparate evidence, of which expert judgement forms a significant part. Bayesian probability may 
be of help here, by providing a formal framework for the representation of uncertainty, but it does 
not remove any of these difficulties. In particular, BBNs are a convenient mechanism for 
conducting the Bayesian computations efficiently (which is not to decry the great intellectual 
achievement of the enabling algorithms developed several years ago). 
 
We feel your readers are not well served by the tone of this article, and believe that the claim that 
BBNs can be used to reduce significantly the effort involved in safety cases is unfounded and 
dangerous. If this were not serious enough, we also believe that the authors greatly underestimate 
the difficulty of using BBNs in this kind of situation. Some examples: 
 
• The authors recommend the use of expert opinion to fill all probability tables. But these 
opinions can only be trusted if based on sufficient knowledge.  Opinions about such subtle 
and poorly known issues as represented in the BBN can only be trusted after a great deal of 
(expensive) scrutiny. Using Bayesian formalism to derive the necessary implications of 
unfounded beliefs produces unfounded conclusions; 
 
• The authors' BBN example has two nodes with 7 parent nodes: the notion that an expert can 
produce a believable 7-dimensional probability distribution, which is required to represent 
his/her beliefs is ludicrous; 
 
• The authors appear to believe that, in the absence of evidence, it is natural to replace 
unknown frequencies of occurrences by uniform probability distributions.  This is a well-
known and difficult problem in Bayesian statistics for which there is no 'correct' solution; 
 
• The authors do not address any of the difficult (and unsolved) problems concerning 
validation of BBNs and complex subjective beliefs. These are particularly relevant to this 
problem, where data are sparse and there is a large component of subjective expert 
judgement; 
 
• The authors unknowingly illustrate the difficulties by not noticing mistakes in the net 
topology they use as an illustration: there are nodes with no parents and no children! 
 
 
All in all, we feel that this article is based on a dangerous mis-interpretation and misuse of the 
capabilities offered by Bayesian belief networks. It makes claims that are not supported and, we 
believe, cannot be supported. Unfortunately, these claims are ones that could, in the hands of the 
ill-informed, be used to justify reductions in the effort needed to justify safety claims. Such an 
outcome would be dangerous.  We would find it disturbing if this had already happened in the 
safety cases of licensed I&C systems, as the authors suggest. 
 
SIGNED: 
Professor R. Bloomfield,  Adelard, London 
Professor P.– J. Courtois, AV Nuclear, Authorized Inspection and Licensing Body, Brussels, 
Professor B. Littlewood, director, Center for Software Reliability, City University, London 
Professor L. Strigini, Center for Software Reliability, City University, London 
